

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR
APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1987

FEDERALS

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20540

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to do everything that this committee can do to hold that high, regardless of Gramm-Rudman or anything else that comes along.

I will go one step further and use a statement that I have often used. I think the perimeter of the Pacific is the secret of peace in this world.

So you have a much larger command in charge than you believe, with all that land that forms the land mass around the Pacific. As long as we have a good hand on that, a good hold on it, we have the world pretty much by the you know what, and that's the way we want to keep it.

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir.

Chairman GOLDWATER. General, it will be a great pleasure to hear from you.

I also visited a few of the places that come under your command. I especially started with Masirah Island, that I affectionately call "Misery Island," because I used to land there in World War II when we ran short of fuel trying to get to India, after flying across Africa, and it is still the damndest place I have ever been.

General, you may proceed any way you see fit.

STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE B. CRIST, USMC, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

General CRIST. Well, Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege to appear before you today and testify on the posture of your youngest territorial unified command, the U.S. Central Command.

I have submitted a prepared statement which I would request be included in the record.

Chairman GOLDWATER. It will be made part of the record.


General CRIST. I would like to make a short overview presentation.

I have given you a small handout, Mr. Chairman, to use as a ready reference as I go through it.

NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES

- MAINTAIN AN INCREASED U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE TO DETER SOVIET AGGRESSION AND COUNTER SOVIET EFFORTS TO GAIN POWER AND HEGEMONY IN THE REGION.
- STRIVE TO REDUCE THE POTENTIAL FOR REGIONAL CONFLICT, ENHANCE REGIONAL STABILITY, AND PROMOTE A FRAMEWORK FOR REGIONAL DEFENSE COOPERATION.
- MAINTAIN ACCESS TO AND UNHINDERED USE OF PERSIAN GULF OIL RESOURCES.

The U.S. national security objectives, which are shown on chart 4, have been clearly articulated, and President Reagan has steadfastly reaffirmed our commitment to protect U.S. and free world interests in the region.



Turning to chart 5, while our objectives are clear, the tensions and the danger of conflict that characterize the Middle East and Southwest Asia present a most difficult context for implementation

of those objectives. The primary threat to Southwest Asia is the historic Russian goal of expanding their boundaries and influence to the south.

These ambitions date back as far as Peter the Great.

In the 20th century alone, the Soviet Union has occupied or invaded Iran and Afghanistan six times.

Today, the Soviets have a firm foothold in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. They are developing a strategic network of bases and basing rights. They have established a significant advisory presence, and they are continuing to increase their diplomatic representation.

In the early 1980's, they formed a new theater of military operations, which is opposite Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan, with a force of some 32 divisions and over 800 aircraft. They now possess not only the desire to expand to the south, but have established a military capability to do so as well.

Complicating the equation are the other threats to regional stability, such as the Iran-Iraq War, Libyan adventurism, the Arab-Israeli confrontation, and state sponsored terrorism, just to name a few.

USCENTCOM MISSION

Ensure continued Western access to Persian Gulf oil.
Deter Soviet aggression and preserve regional stability.
Reduce Soviet regional influence.

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My challenge, laid out on chart No. 6, is to help friendly nations in the region preserve their freedom in the face of the growing threats while ensuring free world access to Persian Gulf oil.

FORCES AVAILABLE

| ARMY | AIR FORCE |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1 AIRBORNE DIVISION | 7 TACTICAL FIGHTER WINGS |
| 1 AIR MOBILE / AIR ASSAULT DIVISION | 2 STRATEGIC BOMBER SQUADRONS |
| 1 MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISION | NAVY |
| 1 INFANTRY DIVISION | 3 CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS |
| 1 MECHANIZED BRIGADE | 1 SURFACE ACTION GROUP |
| 1 CALVARY BRIGADE (AIR COMBAT) | 5 MARITIME PATROL AIR SQUADRONS |
| MARINE CORPS | ALL SERVICES |
| 1-1/3 MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCES | SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES |


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To do my job, I have been assigned, for planning, the forces shown in chart No. 7. Overall, the readiness of the forces you see there is exceptionally high.

My chief area of concern is with Army combat service support, since over 40 percent of these units are reporting not combat ready.

The challenge is to move those forces into my area of responsibility some 7,000 miles by air, or 12,000 miles by sea within 6 weeks, as shown on chart No. 8.


FORCE PROJECTION



The key to doing that is rapid force projection using a combination of airlift, sealift, and pre-positioning.

Airlift is the most flexible and rapid means of force projection.


STRATEGIC AIRLIFT



As can be seen on chart No. 9, we have been making steady progress toward meeting the requirements. With the addition of C-5B's, KC-10's, and a new transport aircraft, plus the planned improvements to the military and Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), the shortfall should be virtually eliminated by the year 2000.

Although fastest, as you know, Mr. Chairman, airlift is also limited.


STRATEGIC SEALIFT



Consequently sealift, addressed on chart No. 10, will be the primary method of delivering force equipment and supplies as well as the bulk of our ammunition and cargo.

As you can see, the Navy has done a remarkable job in meeting the sealift requirements, and they are continuing to work on expanding both capability and capacity.

PRE-POSITIONING




Moving to chart No. 11, pre-positioning, whether ashore or afloat, can sharply reduce total response time and lift if needed.

Afloat pre-positioning has been progressing very well. The 17 pre-positioning ships, now deployed, carry some 165,000 short tons of ammunition and supplies. This is the equivalent of more than 6,100 C-141 sorties.

Ashore pre-positioning has been moving more slowly. We are currently pursuing increased access, but the realities of the political situation make it more difficult for the United States to reach agreement in many areas.

Nonetheless, progress is being made and I remain optimistic.

SUSTAINABILITY



Once in theater, sustainability of our combat forces becomes the challenge. Chart No. 12 shows our current sustainability posture.

As you can see, supplies and equipment and threat munitions are at the moment the softest.

SUSTAINABILITY

- **MUNITIONS - MODERN MUNITIONS SHORTFALLS**
- **WATER - GOAL 20 GAL/DAY/PERSON**
 - FY81-86: PRODUCTION GOAL MET
 - FY87-91: THEATER-DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM COMPLETE
- **POL - STORAGE CAPACITY**
 - FY83-86: 600K TO 1.2M BBLs
 - FY87-91: 1.2M TO 6.4M BBLs
- **MEDICAL**
 - FY86 - 52% OF BED REQUIREMENT AVAILABLE
 - FY87-91 - INCREASES AVAILABILITY TO 73%
- **HOST NATION SUPPORT**
 - SIGNIFICANT: OMAN, SUDAN, SAUDI ARAB
 - MINIMUM: EGYPT, JORDAN, SOMALIA, KENYA, UAE
 - MARGINAL/NONE: PAKISTAN, KUWAIT, YEMEN (YAR)
- **FACILITIES**
 - OMAN, SOMALIA, KENYA, MOROCCO, DIEGO GARCIA, LAJES
 - FY86-86: \$996M
 - FY87: \$40.6M PROGRAMMED

Chart No. 12-A addresses some of the specifics.

Now we are looking at new ways to solve these problems. The services are working with us to overcome the shortage of modern air and ground munitions. Two hundred eighty million dollars have been spent to provide potable water, and an additional \$72 million is included in the 1987 budget for this purpose.

The in-theater need for POL is being addressed by leased tank-age and milcon. Ongoing initiatives should quadruple the current storage capacity by 1990.

In the medical area, we currently meet 52 percent of our hospital bed requirement, and the 1987-91 program will raise the figure to 73 percent.

Progress has been made in gaining host nation agreements, but in many areas U.S. laws and local attitudes make final agreements difficult.

Consequently, we are exploring other innovative ways to procure local support, such as contracting with private firms who operate in my region.

We have recently reviewed a staff draft of an allied mutual support act, which would extend the provisions of the NATO Mutual Support Act to all countries where host nation support is required.

We believe that the provisions for reciprocal support and relief from some of the more restrictive acquisition regulations, would greatly strengthen our ability to obtain host nation cooperation and access.

Command and control of 10 million square miles is no small challenge when you do not live there.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

• PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS

• USCENTCOM HQs IN AREA

• THEATER COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

- 3 MAJOR NODES
- 9 MINOR NODES

• TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS

- FY80-86: 50% TO 60%
- FY87: 64%
- FY92: 78%

For this reason, and several others, looking at chart No. 13, relocating the CENTCOM headquarters in or near the area of responsibility remains a top priority—getting out of Tampa and getting into the area.

Lacking that, I am seeking a viable method to deploy a credible forward headquarters within the area.

Of equal priority is the establishment of an in-place theater communications system, consisting of three major and nine minor communication nodes. The introduction of the first major node is planned for 1987, with the minor nodes planned for procurement between 1990 and 1993.

In the area of tactical communications, we are at about 64 percent of our requirement on hand right now, and the planned enhancements that are in the theater will increase our capacity to 78 percent of requirement by 1992.

INTELLIGENCE

• SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS

- INCREASED PRODUCTION
- INTEGRATED THEATER ARCHITECTURE
- EMPHASIZING INDICATION AND WARNING
- IMPROVING TERRORIST THREAT REPORTING AND WARNING

• IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED

- SIZE, DETAIL DATA BASE
- IMAGERY EXPLOITATION
- DEPLOYABLE, AUTOMATED PROCESSING SYSTEMS
- CONTINUOUS COLLECTION CAPABILITY
- EXPANDED LINGUISTIC CAPACITY
- MORE, BETTER HUMINT

Turning to chart No. 14, with the headquarters located some 7,000 miles from the area of responsibility, extensive, high quality intelligence is not only a requirement, it is an absolute necessity.

We are making substantial progress, but shortfalls still exist in the size and detail of the data base, deployable automated systems, area collection capability, linguistic capacity, and HUMINT.

EXERCISES

| | <u>COMUS</u> | <u>OCOMUS</u> |
|------|---|---|
| FY83 | 1 EXERCISE 12,000 PERSONNEL \$9 MIL | 3 EXERCISES 15,000 PERSONNEL \$55 MIL |
| FY84 | 2 EXERCISES 60,000 PERSONNEL \$40 MIL | 6 EXERCISES 1900 PERSONNEL \$12 MIL |
| FY85 | 1 EXERCISE 50 PERSONNEL NO COST | 4 EXERCISES 60,600 PERSONNEL \$58 MIL |
| FY86 | 2 EXERCISES 49,000 \$31 MIL | 5 EXERCISES 9,200 \$10 MIL |
| FY87 | 1 EXERCISE 50 PERSONNEL \$0.1 MIL | 5 EXERCISES TO BE DETERMINED \$50 MIL |

OCOMUS EXERCISES ARE HELD IN EGYPT, JORDAN, OMAN, SOMALIA AND KENYA

Looking at chart No. 15, there is no substitute for demanding realistic exercises to shape our contingency plans and acclimate our forces to live in and fight in the harsh environment of Southwest Asia.

In fiscal year 1985, we conducted four exercises overseas in five countries, involving over 60,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM LEVELS

| | <u>FY85</u> | <u>FY86</u> | <u>Pres Bud FY87</u> |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------|--------------------------|
| EGYPT | \$1,176.7 | \$1,245.8 | \$1,302.0 |
| PAKISTAN | 326.0 | 311.9 | 341.4 |
| JORDAN | 91.9 | 83.0 | 117.0 |
| KENYA | 21.7 | 20.8 | 21.8 |
| SUDAN | 46.4 | 20.3 | 51.8 |
| SOMALIA | 34.1 | 20.2 | 37.2 |
| OMAN | 40.2 | 19.3 | 40.2 |
| YEMEN | 1.4 | 3.1 | 9.6 |
| DJIBOUTI | <u>2.6</u> | <u>2.0</u> | <u>3.2</u> |
| TOTAL (\$ in millions) | \$1,741.0 | \$1,726.4 | \$1,924.2 |

NOTE 1 Includes MAP, FMS Credits and IMET

2 Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar are totally FMS cash sales

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not mention on chart No. 16, the vital contribution security assistance makes toward projecting and maintaining U.S. influence and presence in my region, while at the same time helping to lay the groundwork for future access and military security cooperation.

In fiscal year 1986, CENTCOM countries were allocated \$1.7 billion. The fiscal year 1987 budget proposed a small increase of \$200 million.

My concern is that in an effort to trim the budget, security assistance is an easy account to cut. However, the effect of doing so has a far greater impact on U.S. influence in the countries concerned than the dollar amounts alone would indicate, particularly in those small nations where our total allocations are already fairly limited to begin with.

To wrap it all up, sir, the Middle East and Southwest Asia remain volatile and unpredictable areas in which the United States continues to have a vital interest. The major external threat to stability in the region is Soviet expansion, against which the only credible deterrent is the U.S. Central Command.

The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. The decision to invade appears to have been carefully considered and was precipitated by a complex set of political circumstances. The USSR introduced forces to Afghanistan to insure the survival of the regime in Kabul in the face of growing popular resistance. Moreover, Moscow was convinced that the United States would not take steps to militarily oppose the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Most certainly, the Soviet leadership in 1979 did not anticipate the costly war of attrition that has since developed in the country. Now, six years later, the invasion, designed to achieve certain limited goals, has become a conscious and dedicated effort to pacify and Sovietize an entire society. Their long term strategy of Sovietization is becoming increasingly obvious:

- Imposition of a governmental structure that mirrors the Soviet system.
- Continued effort to control cities and lines-of-communication.
- Unremitting pressure on the Mujahedin and their civilian supporters.
- Vicious and selective employment of a scorched earth policy, which has resulted in an unprecedented population exodus to Iran and Pakistan now estimated to number 4,000,000 out of a population of 16 million.

Reeducation of over 50,000 children who have been forcibly removed to the Soviet Union.

There is one last point on Afghanistan - Soviet forces are now 400 miles closer to the Persian Gulf and North Arabian Sea, operating from well-positioned military bases that could be used to intimidate other countries in the area.

REGIONAL THREATS

In addition to the Soviet threat, there are numerous other current and potential areas of concern in or near the AOR.

Iran-Iraq War

One of the more volatile conflicts is the Iran/Iraq war, now in its sixth year. The war has destabilized the Persian Gulf region as a whole. Although the ground war has developed into a stalemate, Iran is currently conducting a relatively successful military operation in the southern border region.

A very visible aspect of the conflict has been the "Tanker War" in the Gulf. Since March 1984, Iraq has attacked some 65-70 oil tankers carrying Iranian oil and Iran has retaliated by striking a total of 25-30 ships allegedly moving war material to Iraq.

resettlement, and severe drought. Ethnic rebellions in Tigre, Eritrea and in the Ogaden have tied down its military establishment. Ethiopia's relationship with the Soviet Union will continue to be an unsettling influence to the Horn of Africa.

Somalia

The primary threat to Somalia is posed by Soviet-supported Ethiopia, which has occupied two Somali border towns since 1982. Somalia's ambitions to unite all ethnic Somalis have long concerned Kenya and Ethiopia, serving to isolate the country regionally. Fortunately, recent Somali diplomacy has de-emphasized this issue, which has led to much improved relations with Kenya. Long dominated by tribal clans, Somalia's political development has been a delicate balancing act. The lack of entrenched political institutions and scarce resources make the country vulnerable to external subversion.

Pakistan

Pakistan faces an indigenous threat from tribal dissidents in the northwest border territories supported to some extent by foreign sponsors. Additionally, Iran has sought to extend its influence in Pakistan, particularly among the Shia population. As a result of Pakistani support to the Afghan Mujahedin, the Soviets and their Afghan surrogates have applied considerable military and political pressure on Pakistan. As part of this campaign to intimidate the

GOP, Soviet supported and trained members of Afghanistan's intelligence organization have reportedly conducted bombings and incited trouble among the nearly three million Afghan refugees now in camps inside Pakistan. However, Pakistan's major concern has been and remains, India, the dominant military power in the area. Strong historical animosities between the two nations and difficult real-world problems over borders and the Sikh minorities complicate Indo-Pakistani relations. However, recent diplomatic initiatives, supported by Pakistan's Zia and India's Gandhi, may contribute to improved relations between the two countries.

TERRORISM

The threat of international terrorism against the U.S. and other nations is acute and serves as a destabilizing factor in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Many of the terrorist groups originate in the Middle East and are influenced and supported by Iran, Libya and Syria. These groups pose a significant threat to U.S. interests in the area. The terrorists are becoming more sophisticated in their operations, and are rapidly increasing their ability to identify, target, and successfully attack well-secured facilities. The success of these groups during the past two years demonstrates their increasing proficiency and the consequences of misjudging their intentions and capabilities.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

PROGRAM LEVELS *

(\$ in Millions)

| | FY86 <u>PRES BUD</u> | FY86 <u>APPROPRIATED</u> | FY87 <u>PRES BUD</u> | PRES BUD <u>DELTA 1</u> |
|----------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| EGYPT | 1302.0 | 1245.8 | 1302.0 | 0 |
| PAKISTAN | 126.2 | 311.9 | 141.4 | +5 |
| JORDAN | 97.0 | 83.0 | 117.0 | +21 |
| KENYA | 26.8 | 20.8 | 21.8 | -19 |
| SUDAN | 60.3 | 20.3 | 51.8 | -14 |
| SOMALIA | 41.5 | 20.2 | 37.2 | -10 |
| OMAN | 58.5 | 19.3 | 40.2 | -31 |
| YEMEN | 7.6 | 3.1 | 9.6 | +26 |
| DJIBOUTI | 2.6 | 2.0 | 3.2 | +23 |

*INCLUDES MAP, PMS CREDITS AND INET

NOTE: Security Assistance Programs with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar are totally PMS cash sales.

Our efforts to promote peace in the Middle East are aided by foreign military sales to Saudi Arabia and assistance to Egypt. Jordan needs assistance to correct the serious military imbalance caused by massive Soviet arms sales to Syria. Providing adequate security assistance to Jordan and Saudi Arabia to help them meet

Pakistan

Pakistan is a haven for over three million Afghan refugees and has been under intense pressure from the Soviets due to the continuing GOP support for the Mujahedin. Pakistan's large and well trained forces lack modern equipment necessary to deter or successfully defend against potential Soviet/Afghan aggression. U.S. security assistance is intended to support regional stability by helping Pakistan improve and gain confidence in its defense capabilities and economic performance.

Security Assistance Program

The Security Assistance Program consists of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit financing and cash sales, International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Economic Support Funds (ESF). FMS financing helps pay for the continued modernization of the Pakistani armed forces, principally for the acquisition of aircraft, light helicopters, howitzers, armored vehicles, shipboard weapons systems and munitions. FMS credit purchases will be augmented by cash purchases of similar equipment. The IMET program trains Pakistanis to operate and maintain a range of American-made military equipment. It provides professional leadership and management training, as well as graduate level courses, pilot training and technical training in

maintenance, operations and communications electronics. IMET training is divided, with 50% going to the Army and 25% going to both the Air Force and Navy. ESP funds focus on assisting Pakistani development in energy, agriculture and health sectors. A commodity import program will fund imports of fertilizer, energy and agricultural equipment and will also provide the Pakistani economy with balance of payments support to help it compensate for heavy costs connected with strengthening of its armed forces.

PAKISTAN PROGRAM LEVELS

(\$ IN THOUSANDS)

| USG GRANT AID | <u>FY75-85</u> | <u>FY86</u> | <u>FY87(Proposed)</u> |
|-----------------------|----------------|-------------|-----------------------|
| MAP | 650,281 | 0 | 0 |
| FMS CREDIT (FORGIVEN) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| IMET | <u>27,626</u> | <u>885</u> | <u>1,400</u> |
| GRANT AID TOTAL | 677,907 | 885 | 1,400 |
| USG CREDIT | | | |
| FMS GUARANTEED | 567,633 | 311,025 | 340,000 |
| FMS CONCESSIONAL | <u>325,000</u> | <u>0</u> | <u>0</u> |
| CREDIT TOTAL | 892,633 | 311,025 | 340,000 |
| FMS CASH SALES | 2,954,139 | 0 | 0 |

PAKISTAN TRAINING

| <u>YEAR</u> | <u>IPET</u> | | <u>PMS</u> | | <u>TOTAL</u> | |
|-------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| | <u>STUDENTS</u> | <u>\$(000)</u> | <u>STUDENTS</u> | <u>\$(000)</u> | <u>STUDENTS</u> | <u>\$(000)</u> |
| 83 | 81 | 700 | 28 | 102 | 109 | 802 |
| 84 | 94 | 800 | 327 | 6,207 | 414 | 7,007 |
| 85 | 122 | 1,000 | 107 | 1,507 | 229 | 2,507 |

superior engineers. They are both blowing each other away with heavy artillery.

The problem gets down, then, to who can outstay who? Khomeini has said it is an article of religious tenet and a prophecy that the government in Baghdad will be Shiite. So it does not look to me as if there is going to be any stopping of the war on the part of the Iranians.

The Iraqis, as you know, have made two or three efforts to try to stop that war, to include Saudi mediation, with no response.

What I am concerned about is the capability of the Iraqis, over the long haul, to sustain the war. We see reports now and again of desertion. We see reports of tiredness. Those kinds of things. We have not seen reports of units collapsing, deserting, or any of that sort of thing. But there is just a general war weariness, malaise, and an economic problem settling in.

On the other hand, the Iraqis gave a pretty good lick to the Iranians when they hit Gonaveh. As you know, they have been hitting Kharg. They got the T-jetty and set it afire.

But Gonaveh was where the pumps were that were supplying Kharg. When they went for the jugular there, they turned the oil off for over a week. The Iranians are back up to about 1.5 or 1.6 million barrels of oil per day, but the Iraqis are capable of turning it off.

It is a vicious war and I do not see a winner right now, Senator. But I would worry about the Iraqis in the long haul, whether they can really stay the course.

SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN

Chairman GOLDWATER. I notice that you indicate that in your opinion the Soviets are doing poorly in Afghanistan.

I recall the last briefing I had with the Chiefs of Staff where the entire wall was covered with a map of Afghanistan. They were explaining to me their great interest in Afghanistan. It was to prevent the Soviets from ever gaining access to the northern shores of the Indian Ocean, in Pakistan.

So, the tougher it gets over there, the better.

Sam, I believe you had a few more questions.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DOD REORGANIZATION

I believe you are both very anxious to comment on the committee's recent reorganization efforts. [General laughter.]

I wanted to give you that opportunity.

General Crist, have you had a chance to read the final version of the bill, because there have been considerable changes in it during our mark-up?

General CRIST. Senator Nunn, I have not had an opportunity to read the actual legislation. I have read in some detail the press release, with its attachment, that I believe you put out on March 6, which has a pretty detailed rundown of the salient points. But I have not read the actual document.

Senator NUNN. Well, we would welcome any comments. Fundamentally, we are trying to strengthen the elements in DOD respon-